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Abstract—A number of Internet of Things (IoTs) platforms
have emerged to enable various IoT apps developed by third-
party developers to automate smart homes. Prior research mostly
concerns the overprivilege problem in the permission model.
Our work, however, reveals that even IoT apps that follow
the principle of least privilege, when they interplay, can cause
unique types of threats, named Cross-App Interference (CAI)
threats. We describe and categorize the new threats, showing
that unexpected automation, security and privacy issues may be
caused by such threats, which cannot be handled by existing
IoT security mechanisms. To address this problem, we present
HOMEGUARD, a system for appified IoT platforms to detect
and cope with CAI threats. A symbolic executor module is
built to precisely extract the automation semantics from IoT
apps. The semantics of different IoT apps are then considered
collectively to evaluate their interplay and discover CAI threats
systematically. A user interface is presented to users during
IoT app installation, interpreting the discovered threats to help
them make decisions. We evaluate HOMEGUARD via a proof-of-
concept implementation on Samsung’s SmartThings and discover
many threat instances among apps in the SmartThings public
repository. The evaluation shows that it is precise, effective and
efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of Internet-of-Things (IoTs) has
advanced the development of smart homes to a new era
where emerging centralized and appified (a.k.a., app-powered)
smart home platforms connect heterogenous IoT devices and
offer programming frameworks for third-party developers to
contribute various home automation ideas. According to the
report of German IoT market research firm IoT Analytics in
July 2017, the number of IoT platforms on the market has
grown from 360 to 450 over the past 12 months and smart
home platforms account for 21 percent [1]. Representative
examples of such platforms are Samsung SmartThings [7],
Apple HomeKit [5], and Google Android Things [4]. By
installing IoT apps on a platform, users can monitor, remotely
control, and automate their IoT devices to make smarter
homes. However, appified IoT platforms also introduce new
app-level attack surfaces, which can be exploited by attackers
or misused by homeowners, introducing new challenges in
security and privacy. For example, burglars can stealthily open
a smart door lock via an IoT app to break into homes, which
is impossible in non-appified IoT systems.
Fernandes et al. [22] discover design flaws such as the
overprivilege problem in Samsung’s SmartThings, one of the
most mature smart home platforms; they demonstrate that
malicious apps can be constructed to expose smart homes to
severe attacks that exploit the overprivilege problem. Thus,
some systems are proposed to handle the problem. ContexIoT
[29] proposes a context-based permission system to involve
users into making decisions on whether a security-critical
command in an IoT app during runtime should proceed under
the current context. SmartAuth [46] compares the analysis
result of the app code with the code annotations and app
description to identify overprivilege in an app, and allows users
to specify access control policies. Tyche [40] designs a risk-
based permission model over the original model which groups
all supported permission-defined commands into three risk
levels, and allows users to specify a maximum risk level for
any installed app. Thus, permissions greater than the specified
level will be denied during the app execution. Instead of
handling security threats proactively, ProvThings [47] presents
a runtime logging system for forensics and diagnosis purposes.
This paper reveals that new types of threats, which we call
Cross-App Interference (CAI) threats, can be caused by apps
even if the permission system strictly follows the principle
of least privilege. Hence, CAI threats do not depend on the
overprivilege problem; when IoT apps installed at the same
smart environment interplay, various CAI threats may arise.
First, when a smart home is installed with apps provided by
different third-party developers, there is a chance that some
apps may contain conflicting logics in terms of how to control
an IoT device. For example, given a certain combination of
sensor values, two apps issue opposite commands for open-
ing/closing a smart door, which not only confuses homeowners
but also causes seriously exploitable security issues.
Second, the action taken by a smart device, due to the
execution of one app, may trigger a chained execution of
another app, but not all such chained executions are desired
by homeowners and some may even cause security or privacy
issues. For example, assuming an app is to turn off the light
when no motion is detected for a period of time, while another
app is to open the curtain if the room is too dark during the
daytime, then opening the curtain becomes a chained action
due to the light-off action. Such chained actions may occur
An earlier version of this paper was submitted to ACM CCS’18 on May
9th, 2018. This version contains some minor modifications based on that
submission.
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only under specific circumstances; thus, they impose security
and privacy threats that are hidden from users.
In addition to threats imposed by benign apps, attackers may
construct CAI threats by including seemingly benign logic
into a malicious app to successfully pass the code review. But
the app is to interact with other apps to launch attacks, e.g.,
opening the smart door. That is, exploitation of such threats
can become a new attack vector against smart environments.
Therefore, it is important and urgent to present, detect, and
handle the new types of threats. The goal of this work is thus to
(1) describe CAI threats and categorize them, (2) propose and
implement a technique to automatically discover such threats,
and (3) present the revealed threats to homeowners in a user-
friendly way and allow them to make informed decisions in
handling these threats.
Existing techniques cannot discover CAI threats, as they
analyze apps individually and most of them focus on IoT app-
level threats exploiting overly granted permissions, while CAI
threats are essentially due to the intricate interplay between
multiple apps. Hence, discovering the new type of threats calls
for cross-app-boundary semantics-relation analysis (i.e., how
the logic defined in one IoT app may interfere with that of
another app), which is the main challenge of our work.
Our idea is to extract the automation semantics (also re-
ferred to as rules) from each app and then discover the threats
by evaluating the interaction relations between the extracted
semantics collectively and systematically. To precisely capture
the semantics of an app, we propose to perform symbolic
execution analysis on IoT apps. The semantics of each app is
then represented as quantifier-free first-order formulas. Lastly,
an automatic method based on constraint solver is applied
for discovering CAI threats, which are then interpreted into
a human-readable form and presented to homeowners.
Instead of requiring the repetitive intervention of users to
handle such threats, we propose a deployment method that
is much more user-friendly and easy to deploy. Whenever a
new app is to be installed, our system interposes and analyzes
whether there exist CAI threats between the new app and the
already-installed ones. As a result, the homeowner only needs
to spend one-time decision making for each app to be installed.
We develop a proof-of-concept prototype system HOME-
GUARD on Samsung SmartThings, which at the time of
research supports the largest number of IoT devices and IoT
apps (i.e., SmartApps). Our evaluation shows that HOME-
GUARD can precisely discover CAI threats from real-world
SmartApps, and generate the analysis results instantly.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We describe new types of threats in smart environments,
Cross-App Interference threats, which do not depend on
overprivileged apps. Attackers may exploit such threats by
inserting seemingly benign logics so that malicious apps
can pass the conventional code review but may interact with
other apps in a harmful way. Besides, even benign apps, due
to their interplay, may cause undesired or even dangerous
consequences.
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Fig. 1: The home automation model.
• We present a semantics-based user-friendly system HOME-
GUARD that not only discovers CAI threats but also as-
sists users to handle them. Our approach introduces zero-
modification to the smart home platform architecture and
only needs user intervention during app installation.
• We design and build a symbolic execution engine that can
precisely extract automation semantics from SmartApps.
To our knowledge, this is the first symbolic executor for
SmartApp code.
• We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of HOME-
GUARD. The evaluation shows that it can detect all of
the categories of CAI threats precisely and efficiently. Our
experiments discover and verify many threat instances from
real-world apps in the SmartThings public repository.
II. BACKGROUND
We first describe the home automation model, and then
introduce the popular cloud-backed smart home platforms.
A. Home Automation Model
A home automation model can be abstracted into the data
layer and the control layer.
Data Layer. The data layer of a home is its home context,
consisting of sensors, actuators, and the home environment.
(1) A sensor in our model may be a traditional device
or subsystem that measures a specific feature in the home
environment (e.g., the temperature), a device that can report a
certain attribute of itself (e.g., a switch can report its on/off
status), or a platform-defined feature (e.g., a location mode
in SmartThings). (2) An actuator can be either a controllable
device or platform-defined feature. An IoT device may be
a sensor, an actuator or a combination. (3) The home envi-
ronment has a set of measurable natural features, including
time, temperature, illuminance, humidity, power consumption,
etc. The interaction relation of sensors, actuators, and the
environment is shown in Fig. 1. Sensors observe the home
environment features and output the corresponding measure-
ments while actuators can influence the reading of sensors
either directly (e.g., by altering its own device attribute) or
via the environment (e.g., by heating the home to change the
measurement reading of a temperature sensor).
Control Layer. In appified home automation systems, the
control layer consists of the automation rules defined by home
automation apps. An app usually defines one or more rules.
The rule follows a trigger-condition-action (TCA) model, as
depicted in Fig. 1: (1) The trigger is a subscribed event (e.g.,
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Fig. 2: SmartThings architecture overview.
the state of television changes to on) that fires the execution of
the remaining flow of the rule. The platform listens to all data
reported by sensors, and then broadcasts the related events
to the subscribers. (2) The condition is a set of constraints
defined in terms of the sensor data, the environment data (e.g.,
the time) or a user input (e.g., the room temperature is above
30◦C), which must be satisfied in order to take the action.
(3) The action (e.g., to open the window) is one or more
commands issued to the actuators.
The data layer and the control layer interact in both di-
rections. On the one hand, rules obtain data from the home
context. For example, the trigger of a rule is usually a specific
sensor data update (e.g., the state of TV changes to on); the
condition takes sensor data and environment measurements as
the inputs for constraint check. On the other hand, rules can
influence the home context, i.e., the actions issue commands
to the actuators, which may, in turn, change the environment
features and sensor readings.
B. Appified Smart Home Platforms
Recently, multiple cloud-backed smart home platforms have
emerged. They allow third-party developers to publish their
IoT apps to help users manage, monitor and control their home
devices. The integration of app developers is significant to
share novel ideas and build smarter homes. A typical cloud-
backed smart home ecosystem comprises three necessary
components: a hub connecting IoT devices, a back-end cloud,
and a smartphone app.
We use the Samsung SmartThings platform (as shown in
Fig. 2), one of the most popular smart home platforms,
as an example to describe these components. (1) The hub
connects all IoT devices through short-range wireless tech-
niques (ZigBee, Z-Wave, Bluetooth) or WiFi and bridges the
communication between IoT devices and the Internet. Each
of the low-cost and resource-constrained IoT devices usually
only supports one of these wireless access techniques, while a
hub is equipped with most, if not all, of the popular wireless
capabilities. The hub plays a core role to ensure the intercon-
nectivity and interoperability of IoT devices in the home envi-
ronment. (2) The backend cloud (also referred to as platform in
this paper), is another key part in the system. The SmartThings
cloud abstracts real devices to device handler instances, which
are software wrappers of the physical devices. A device
Trigger
Rule 1 TV is 
turned on
Room temperature
             
Open the 
window
Condition Action
TV is 
turned on
Weather 
== rainy
Close the 
windowRule 2
Overlapping 
situations
Fig. 3: An example of Action-Interference Threats.
handler handles the real underlying communication between
the cloud and a physical device and exposes a subset of pre-
defined uniform interfaces to the other components within the
platform. SmartApps are Groovy programs provided by third-
party developers and are used to provide automation rules for
the home devices. Specifically, SmartApps can subscribe to
the events fired by a set of instances of device handlers and
issue commands to device handlers; thus, SmartApps interact
with the real devices indirectly. The SmartThings provide the
sandboxed runtime environment for running SmartApp and
device handlers. (3) To provide a convenient user interface (UI)
for users to manage their hubs, IoT devices and SmartApps,
SmartThings also provide a smartphone companion app with
a SmartApp store. In the companion app, users can install and
configure a SmartApp, e.g., granting IoT devices that support
the capabilities1 requested by SmartApps, and filling out user-
defined values. We call user-provided information in this phase
the configuration information.
III. CATEGORIZATION OF CAI THREATS
A rule can be modeled as a tuple of “trigger-condition-
action”. Suppose R1 = (T1, C1, A1) and R2 = (T2, C2, A2)
denote two rules that are installed in the same environment,
where Ti, Ci, Ai are the trigger, condition, and action of Ri,
respectively. A Cross-App Interference threat arises when the
action of R1 interferes with the trigger, condition, or action
of R2. R1 and R2 may or may not belong to the same app,
and our system HOMEGUARD can handle both cases, so we
do not distinguish between the two cases in this paper.
Based on how R2 is interfered with by R1, we have
identified the following three basic classes of CAI threats:
Trigger-Interference Threats, Condition-Interference Threats,
and Action-Interference Threats, which arise when the trigger,
condition, and action of R2 is interfered with by the action
of R1, respectively. We summarize the different categories
of CAI threats in Table I. The caption of Table I gives the
notations in this section.
A. Action-Interference Threats
Two rules R1 and R2 may be programmed to operate on
the same actuator under different circumstances (decided by
their own triggers and conditions). It is likely that both rules
take effect simultaneously if they are both triggered (T1 = T2)
1See Appendix A for more details about capabilities.
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TABLE I: Categorization of CAI threats. Ri = (Ti, Ci, Ai), i = 1, 2 denotes two rules, where Ti, Ci, Ai are the trigger,
condition and action, respectively. Ai 7→ Tj denotes Ai satisfies Tj . Ai ⇒ Cj and Ai ; Cj denotes that Ai satisfies and
dissatisfies a subset of constraints in Cj , respectively. G(Ai) denotes the goal of Ai.
Category and description Pattern
Action-Interference
Threats
Actuator Race (AR): Two rules perform contradictory actions on the same
actuator(s).
T1 = T2, C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅, A1 = ¬A2
Goal Conflict (GC): Two rules’ actions have contradictory goals. (T1 ∪ C1) ∩ (T2 ∪ C2) 6= ∅, G(A1) = ¬G(A2)
Trigger-Interference
Threats
Covert Triggering (CT): A rule triggers the execution of other rules. A1 7→ T2, C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅
Self Disabling (SD): A rule triggers other rules which in turn disables it. A1 7→ T2, C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅, A2 = ¬A1
Loop Triggering (LT): Two rules trigger each other but perform contradictory
actions on the same actuator(s).
A1 7→ T2, A2 7→ T1, C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅, A1 = ¬A2
Condition-Interference
Threats
Enabling-Condition (EC): A rule enables the execution of other rules. A1 ⇒ C2
Disabling-Condition (DC): A rule disables the execution of other rules. A1 ; C2
and their conditions are both satisfied (C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅). If R1
and R2 issue contradictory commands to the same actuator
(A1 = ¬A2), an Actuator Race threat may arise, such that the
final status of the actuator becomes unpredicted.
Fig. 3 shows such an example. If it is raining and the
temperature is above 30◦C, the conditions of both rules are
satisfied, and both rules are triggered when the TV is turned
on. However, the two rules issue opposite commands on the
window, leading to a race condition. To verify the threat, we
have constructed two SmartApps that define Rule 1 and Rule 2
shown in Fig. 3, respectively, and run them to control the same
window opener’s switch. We observed a variety of results:
the switch is turned on only, turned off only, turned on then
off, and turned off then on, showing that the final state is
unpredictable.
Note that such races arise only under specific conditions.
As a result, the threats may hide in a smart environment for
a prolonged time. Such races may confuse the user and cause
annoyance or device damages; they may even be exploited by
attackers (e.g., the window is left open without being expected
by the user).
A variant of Action-Interference Threats arise when two
rules are executed on different actuators in certain situations
(T1 ∪ C1) ∩ (T2 ∪ C2) 6= ∅), but their effects contradict
(G(A1) = ¬G(A2)), which we call Goal Conflicts. Different
from the instant race on an actuator, the two rules do not need
to be triggered at the same time. The inter-actuator conflict is
more subtle and implicit than intra-actuator races and hence
more difficult to be realized by users. For instance, one rule
is to turn on a heater, while the other is to open the window
if the room is too dark; the two actions conflict in terms of
heating up the room.
B. Trigger-Interference Threats
Since all rules interact within a common home context, a
rule R1’s action may change the home context to a status that
triggers another rule R2 (A1 7→ T2); if the triggering happens
under certain circumstances where R2’s condition is satisfied
(C1∩C2 6= ∅), R2 is also executed after R1. Thus, a group of
explicitly defined rules may lead to new implicit rules, which
Trigger
Rule 1 TV is turned on Temperature 
       
Open the 
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Turn on 
the TVRule 3
Fig. 4: An example of Trigger-Interference Threats.
we call covert rules. As shown in Fig. 4, Rule 3 turns on the
TV, which then triggers the execution of Rule 1. A covert rule
“when sending a voice message if it is on Thursday and the
temperature is over 30◦C then open the window” is formed.
In this example, a user may only intend to use Rule 3 to
turn on the TV remotely for the purpose of watching a live
show immediately when arriving home, but it also triggers
Rule 1 to open the window, creating a chance for a burglar
to break in before the user arrives home. In other words, such
Covert Triggering may not be desired by the users. Thus, it is
important to find such covert rules and alert the users when
apps are installed.
There are two special cases of Trigger-Interference Threats:
(1) Self Disabling that happens when R1 covertly triggers
R2 but R2’s action contradicts that of R1 (A2 = ¬A1). For
instance, R1 is defined as “when the motion sensor detects a
motion at the front door if the temperature is above 30◦C
then turn on the air conditioner”, and R2 is “when the
energy meter’s reading exceeds a threshold then turn off
the air conditioner”. If turning on the air conditioner makes
the reading of the power meter exceeds a threshold, the air
conditioner will be turned off immediately after it is turned
on. (2) Loop Triggering that occurs when two rules trigger
each other (A1 7→ T2, A2 7→ T1, C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅) but perform
contradictory actions on the same actuator(s) (A1 = ¬A2). For
example, R1 is defined as “when the illuminance is below 30
LUX then turn on the lights”, and R2 is “when the illuminance
is above 50 LUX then turn off the lights”; as a result, when
the two rules control the same set of lights, the lights may
4
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Fig. 5: An example of Condition-Interference Threats.
be continuously turned on and off, which can not only cause
device damages, but also lead to seizures in photosensitive
epilepsy sufferers [42].
C. Condition-Interference Threats
The action due to a rule R1 may change the satisfaction of
another rule R2’s condition, and thus affect the execution of
R2, which are called Condition-Interference Threats. However,
unlike Trigger-Interference Threats, the action of R1 cannot
directly trigger the execution of R2, as R2 has its own trigger.
There are two types of Condition-Interference Threats:
Enabling-Condition Interference and Disabling-Condition In-
terference, depending on whether the action of R1 changes
the condition of R2 from false to true (Enabling, A1 ⇒
C2) or from true to false (Disabling, A1 ; C2).
Fig. 5 shows an example of Disabling-Condition Interference
Threats, where Rule 5 turns off the floor lamp automatically
to save energy when the home is in the “sleep” mode, while
Rule 4 is used to detect break-ins. The action “turning off the
floor lamp” in Rule 5 disables the floor lamp checking in Rule
4 and may lead to false negatives.
IV. PROBLEM SCOPE AND SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A. Threat Model
Cross-App Interference threats do not depend on the over-
privilege problem of the smart things platform; moreover, they
do not rely on malicious code to be inserted into a single
app, which may not be able to pass the manual code review
step (e.g., code review of each submitted app is enforced by
Samsung SmartThings). Thus, CAI threats are more stealthy
and cannot be handled by existing approaches that analyze or
review apps individually.
Our defense system considers and addresses CAI threats
that can be caused by three types of IoT apps:
• Flawless Benign Apps: Although they contain no malicious
or flawed code, they may cause CAI threats because of
interaction with other apps.
• Flawed Benign Apps: They contain flawed logic, e.g.,
inconsistent rules, that leads to CAI threats.
• Malicious Apps: They contain malicious code that pur-
posely exploits other apps deployed in the same home. The
attacker can submit malicious apps onto the app store, or
trick users to install them through the web.
Even non-malicious apps can cause CAI threats, which can
surprise and confuse users and lead to security and privacy
issues without involving any attackers. Although users may
sometimes perceive CAI threats and avoid installing risky
apps, various reasons lead to the failure of identifying such
threats by relying on the carefulness of ordinary users. First,
users may not understand all functionalities of an app by only
reading its description. Second, a home may have multiple
users; even a single user may install an app first, and after a
long time, install another controlling the same device for dis-
tinct purposes. Third, users may write their own apps or obtain
apps from third-party sources to realize novel automation ideas
(e.g., controlling devices for a special purpose, achieving the
same functionality with the limited devices they own, etc.).
However, these apps may be flawed and vulnerable to CAI
threats when working with other apps. Therefore, an automatic
detection technique is necessary.
New Attack Vectors. Moreover, we identify three new attack
vectors that exploit CAI threats. (1) If an attacker can infer
or obtain the information about the apps installed at a target
home, he can find the CAI threats at this location (e.g.,
the window is opened at a specific time) and exploit them
accordingly. (2) The attacker can publish seemingly benign but
malicious apps onto the app store, or trick users into installing
them by advertising some useful functionalities. Such apps can
be built to cause CAI threats by taking advantage of other apps
installed at the target home. (3) If multiple collusive malicious
apps are installed at the same home, they can cooperate to
construct CAI threats and launch powerful finely-controlled
attacks.
B. Goal and Problem Scope
The goal of our system is to detect CAI threats in a smart
home, no matter they are caused by benign or malicious apps.
This paper broadly uses threats to refer to all discovered
interferences, acknowledging that some of them may be unex-
pected and dangerous while others may be desired by users.
Instead of distinguishing the two cases, which is probably a
non-computable problem, we present the detection results to
homeowners in a human-readable way, which alerts the owners
and allows them to make decisions on whether or not to keep
the new app and or re-configure it.
In this paper, we focus on application security with the
assumption of trusted and uncompromised platforms, devices
and communication protocols. For example, attacks that ex-
ploit the hardware vulnerabilities or communication protocol
flaws to intercept or fake the data used by an app and thus
lead to an incorrect app behavior are out of our scope and
should be taken care of by the device manufacturers, protocol
designers and IoT platform to guarantee the authenticity and
integrity of the data.
C. System Overview
In order to detect the CAI threats in a given home, all the
apps and their interaction need to be considered collectively
and systematically. To speed up the detection, the design of
HOMEGUARD has the offline part and the online part: the
offline part extracts and represents the automation semantics
of each app in the form of rules (Section II-A); when a new
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Fig. 6: The architecture of HOMEGUARD.
app is being installed, the online part is invoked to detect
CAI threats by considering the interplay of all the rules of
the new app and installed apps. The detection result is then
presented to users for decision making. The advantage is that
the online part can be computed efficiently by making use
of the rules extracted offline. We build HOMEGUARD using a
modular design. As shown in Fig. 6, it comprises the following
four modules:
• Rule extractor extracts the rules of each smart home app
offline. It exposes APIs for querying the rules of an app
and also provides online rule extraction services for users
who use custom apps. Other modules of HOMEGUARD are
per-user processes and are called each time a new app A is
being installed.
• Configuration collector collects the configuration informa-
tion related to the installation, which includes the app name,
the devices bound to the app A, and the in-app static values
(thresholds, boolean values, contact information, etc.).
• Threat detector is invoked when the configuration recorder
receives the configuration information from configuration
collector. After that, the rule recorder requests the rule
information of A from the rule extractor. The rule recorder
and the configuration recorder keep track of the historical
rule and configuration information of apps, respectively.
Based on the newly received rule and configuration informa-
tion and the historical records, the detection engine detects
CAI threats by considering the interplay of A and already
installed apps.
• HOMEGUARD frontend bridges the system and smart
home users. The rule interpreter translates rules of A into a
human-readable form and displays them via a user interface,
such that users can check if A itself will behave as it claims.
The threat interpreter displays the detected CAI threats
to users in a readable manner, who then decide whether
the installation should proceed or whether the configuration
should be adjusted.
Note that the rule extractor and the configuration collector
are platform-specific since different IoT platforms use different
programming languages and provide different APIs, while the
threat detector and the HOMEGUARD frontend are platform-
independent. The details of the rule extractor and the threat
detector will be presented in Section V and Section VI,
respectively. We present the other modules in Section VII.
Listing 1: Code snippet of ComfortTV. Some irrelevant lines
(e.g., metadata definition, UI-related sections and pages) are
omitted.
1input "tv1", "capability.switch", title: "Which TV?"
2input "tSensor", "capability.temperatureMeasurement"
3input "threshold1", "number", title: "Higher than?"
4input "window1", "capability.switch"
5def installed () {
6subscribe( tv1 , "switch", onHandler)
7}
8def updated() {
9unsubscribe()
10subscribe( tv1 , "switch", onHandler)
11}
12def onHandler(evt ) {
13def t = tSensor . currentValue ("temperature")
14if (( evt . value == "on") && (t > threshold)) turnOnWindow()
15}
16def turnOnWindow() {
17if (window1.currentSwitch == "off")
18window1.on()
19}
V. RULE REPRESENTATION AND EXTRACTION
We present the rule representation in Section V-A and
then the rule extraction technique in Section V-B. While
our idea is applicable to multiple smart home platforms, we
concretely demonstrate the proposed techniques on Samsung
SmartThings platform. For the convenience of discussion,
we develop 5 SmartApps, ComfortTV, ColdDefender,
CatchLiveShow, BurglarFinder, and NightCare,
which implement Rule 1-5 depicted in Figures 3, 4 and 5,
respectively. We use the code of ComfortTV (see Listing 1)
to discuss the rule extraction. Discussion about rule extraction
on other platforms is in Section VIII-D.
A. Rule Representation
The goal of our rule extraction module is to precisely extract
rule-related information from the app code and represent the
information in a uniform form.
Listing 2: The rule representation format
Trigger:
(:subject).(:attribute)
(:constraint)
Condition:
(:data constraints)
(:predicate constraints)
Action:
(:subject)->(:command)(:paras)(:when)(:period)
(:data constraints)
Listing 2 shows the structured rule representation format
we use. It contains detailed and precise information about
the trigger, condition, and action of a rule. (1) the trigger is
defined in terms of subject (e.g., a certain device), attribute,
and constraint (that should be satisfied for executing the
rule). (2) the condition comprises the data constraints (that
describe how variables are assigned values) and the predicate
constraints (that should be satisfied for proceeding to invoke
the action). (3) the action depicts the subject on which com-
mand is issued, where paras. denotes the parameters related
to the command and data constraints denotes all quantitative
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constraints involving the command parameters; plus, when
denotes the scheduled time and period indicates the repetition
interval for issuing the command. By default, both when and
period are equal to 0, meaning that the command should be
issued with no delay and only once, respectively.
B. Symbolic Execution based Rule Extraction
We perform a static analysis on the source code of Smar-
tApps to extract rules. Although most rules defined by Smar-
tApps are static, we also handle rule dynamics due to con-
figuration updating and the dynamic features of Groovy in
Section VII and Section VIII-D, respectively.
Why did prior approaches fail? Prior approaches [29],
[47] instrument SmartApps to insert runtime logging logic,
so that when sensitive commands are issued during runtime,
the context information can be collected. Such runtime logging
approaches do not work for our purpose, as they only provide
the information for rules that have been executed, while our
goal is to extract all the rules before they are executed.
SmartAuth [46] searches the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of
the SmartApp source code to look for information of interest
(e.g., the trigger event, the attribute, and the action) without
tracking the data flows, so it cannot precisely retrieve the
constraint information due to variable assignments and nested
branches.
Why symbolic execution? In order to extract the rules of a
SmartApp completely and precisely, we propose to symbol-
ically execute the app, exploring all of its execution paths.
Each path starts from an entry point and ends at a sensitive
command (i.e., sink): the command reveals the action of
a rule, while the path condition exposes the rule trigger
and the condition. In order to enable symbolic execution on
SmartApps, the following questions and technical challenges
need to be resolved.
Path search strategy. A well-known limitation about sym-
bolic execution is its poor scalability due to path explosion.
However, as SmartApps are small and have limited paths,
we are able to analyze them without encountering the path
explosion problem. A simple depth-first path search strategy
works well in our system.
Symbolic inputs. Data whose values are not dependent on
other data are handled as symbolic inputs or sources. In
SmartApps, sources include device references, device attribute
values, device events, user input, HTTP response, constant
values and return values of several APIs (see API modeling
below). We achieve a completely automatic symbolic input
identification. We parse all input method calls to collect
device references (each device reference points to a globally
unique 128-bit identifier for a home device connected to
SmartThings) and user inputs (variables whose values are
specified by users during app installation or update) and add
a symbolic input label to each of them. Besides, we define
variables to denote device attribute values used in the code
and label them as symbolic inputs. Similarly, variables which
accept HTTP responses and constant value are also labeled
as sources. A special case is State and atomicState,
which are objects for storing a small amount of data which
can be shared across multiple SmartApp executions. We regard
them as symbolic inputs as well. For example, in Listing 1,
the devices references (tv1, tSensor, window1), the user
input (threshold), and the return value of the API call at
Line 13 are automatically labeled as symbolic inputs.
Analysis entry points and sinks. In our implementa-
tion, the analysis entry points include the lifecycle meth-
ods, installed, updated and uninstalled. The
analysis sinks include capability-protected device com-
mands and security sensitive SmartThings APIs (such as
setLocationMode()). We consider 126 device control
commands protected by 104 capabilities [8] and 21 SmartApp
APIs (See Appendix A).
Generating Control-Flow Graph (CFG). We follow the
approach in [29] to generate a control-flow graph built
on AST transformation. Our design is to model the
trigger-condition-action structure of a rule. A rule with
a trigger usually starts from an event subscribed by in
a subscribe(dev,attr,hndl) method (typically in-
voked in one of the analysis entry point methods). The
subscribe() call means that when the device dev’s at-
tribute attr changes, the event handler hndl should be
invoked. Therefore, each subscribe method represents a
trigger. Then we trace into the handler to identify sinks along
the execution path. The path branches at conditional statement
(e.g., if or switch statement) so we may reach different
sinks, which are extracted as actions; the boolean expressions
within the condition statements along the execution path from
an entry point to a sink are used to construct the condition for
that sink. The corresponding trigger, condition, and action are
assembled into a rule.
Constraints for the trigger and condition. The subscribe
method may define a trigger in different ways, i.e., us-
ing a state change (e.g., subscribe(tv1, "switch",
onHandler)) or a certain value (e.g., subscribe(tv1,
"switch.on", onHandler) to trigger the execution of
the handler. If a conditional statement follows along the
execution path to compare the subscribed event’s value (e.g.,
Line 14 in Listing 1), the comparison in terms of the event’s
value is regarded as part of the trigger constraint; otherwise,
the trigger is only a state change and has no constraint.
We track all data constraints and predicate constraints along
the execution path from the entry point to sinks and attach
them (excluding the trigger constraint) to the rule condition.
We establish data constraints from each value assignment
statement. Specifically, we write callback methods in the
compiler to handle the 38 expression types defined in Groovy’s
documentation [24]. On the other hand, we also build predi-
cate constraints from condition statements, i.e., each boolean
expression in an if statement or each case expression in a
switch statement is translated into a constraint. We also
handle the ternary expressions by breaking each of them into
two branches.
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TABLE II: Rule representation of Rule 1.
Trigger Condition Action
subject: tv1
attribute: switch
constraint:
tv1.switch==on
data constraints:
t = tSensor.temperature
tSensor.temperature=#DevState
threshold1 = 30
predicate constraints:
t > threshold1
window1.switch == off
subject: window1
command: on
paras: []
data constraints:
[]
when: 0
period: 0
API modeling. The main challenge is to deal with the closed-
source APIs provided by SmartThings. We first model the
10 SmartApp APIs2 that schedule the execution of specified
methods according to their arguments and functionalities.
For example, runIn(delay, method) executes method
with the specified time delay. We attach the delay information
to the scheduled method and continue to trace into the sched-
uled method to identify sinks. The successive sinks are also
attached with the delay (note that we use a when property to
handle delayed commands).
To model APIs that may be involved in the constraint con-
struction, we model the objects, methods and object property
accesses by manually reviewing the SmartThings developer
documentation [10]. The return values of API methods and
the object properties that do not rely on other data are also
labeled as symbolic inputs. We model 173 API methods and 94
object property accesses in total and rewrite a static modeling
function for each method or property access according to its
arguments and return value. We further model a portion of
external Java APIs that are used by SmartApps. Based on these
modeling functions, we are able to construct constraints over
expressions that contain API calls.
Compiler customization. To build the symbolic executor, we
implement a compilation customizer instance and add it to
the compiler configuration, which is supported by Groovy
to allow developers to modify the compilation process at a
certain phase. We work at the semantic analysis phase where
the compiler creates a class node for each element (variable,
method, expression, statement) in the source code and a set of
visit methods that follow the generic Visitor pattern [38] can
be implemented for different class node types to specify how
the compiler processes these nodes.
As a concrete example, Table II shows the result of rule
extraction on the code in Listing 1.
VI. CAI THREAT DETECTION
Whenever a new app is installed or the configuration of
an installed app is updated, our Threat Detector detects CAI
threats by evaluating the interaction relations between the rules
of the installed or updated app and those of apps already
installed in the smart home.
2See Appendix A for the details.
A. Detecting Action-Interference Threats
We detect the Actuator Race (AR) and Goal Conflict (GC)
threat (see Table I) between two rules R1 and R2 in two steps:
action analysis and then overlapping-constraint detection.
1) Action Analysis: To detect Actuator Races, we first
examine if the actions of R1 and R2 issue contradictory
commands to the same actuator, or issue the same command
with contradictory parameters; either of the two situations
indicates the rule pair is an Actuator Race candidate. We use
device IDs from the configuration recorder (see Section VII)
to determine if the two rules control the same device. We
maintain a global mapping MAR that maps a device ID to the
list of rules that operate on the device along with the command
and parameter information. The mapping will be used in the
subsequent overlapping-condition detection step.
To detect Goal Conflicts, we perform a goal analysis to
determine if two actions contradict over a common goal. A
goal in smart home consists of many measurable properties,
such as temperature, illuminance, humidity, noise, etc. We
consider how these properties are affected by each command
of a device type. The effects are denoted as + (increasing),
− (decreasing) and # (irrelevant). Accordingly, we construct
another global mapping MGC for the goal analysis. Note that
virtual actuators (e.g., mode) that have no direct effect on
the goal properties are not included in MGC . R1 and R2 are
considered as a Goal Conflict candidate if their actions have
opposite effects on the same goal property.
2) Overlapping-Condition Detection: To determine
whether a candidate rule pair R1 and R2 can lead to a
real threat, we also need to know if they can be executed
simultaneously in a certain situation, i.e., if they have
overlapping trigger and/or condition. Note that we establish
constraints for trigger and condition in our rule extraction
(Section V-B). Therefore, the overlapping detection is
transformed into a constraint satisfaction problem. We merge
all constraints of the two rules as well as additional device
constraints3; if the problem is solvable4, it means two rules
take effect together under certain situations (which can be
derived from the resolution results), and the rule pair causes
a true Action-Interference Threat.
B. Detecting Trigger-Interference Threats
The detection of Covert Triggering (CT) threat over two
rules R1 and R2 is a directed process since Covert Triggering
is not mutative. There are two ways that R1 triggers R2:
(1) R1 issues a command to an actuator (e.g., a switch),
changing its certain state that is the trigger of R2; (2) R1
changes an environment feature (e.g., temperature) sensed by
a sensor device whose reading is used as R2’s trigger. The
trigger checking step follows the above two ways to determine
whether R1 could trigger R2.
3Device constraints are to determine if two rules use the same device. See
Section VII for more information.
4We choose the Java Constraint Programming (JaCoP) library as the solver
since it is efficient and open-source in our implementation.
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If the rule pair passes the trigger checking step, it is a CT
candidate and an overlapping-condition detection is performed
on the conditions of R1 and R2 to see if they are likely
to execute together in certain situations. If the rule pair is
a CT candidate and has overlapping conditions, R1 and R2
constitute a CT pair, denoted as CTR1→R2 .
When CTR1→R2 (or CTR2→R1 ) is detected, we further
detect Self Disabling (SD) threats by examining the action
analysis result in Section VI-A1. If R1 and R2 are also an
Actuator Race candidate, an SD threat is detected. In addition,
if both CTR1→R2 and CTR2→R1 are detected and R1 and R2
are AR candidate, a Loop Triggering Interference (LT) threat
is discovered.
C. Detecting Condition-Interference Threats
To detect whether the rule R1 has Enabling Condition
(EC) Interference and Disabling Condition (DC) Interference
with rule R2, we evaluate whether R1 enables/disables R2’s
condition. Similar to the detection of Trigger Interference
threats, there are two ways that R1 can affect R2’s condition:
(1) R1 issues a command to an actuator, which changes the
satisfaction of R2’s condition (e.g., R1 turns on a heater and
R2 checks if the heater’s state is on); and (2) R1 changes
an environment feature to enable/disable the condition of R2
(e.g., R1 turns on the heater and the condition of R2 involves
the room temperature). If R1 affects R2 in either of the above
ways, the rule pair is a condition-interference threat candidate.
We then determine whether R1 enables or disables R2’s
condition by another overlapping-condition detection. Specifi-
cally, we first create an effect constraint to denote the effect of
R1’s action. For instance, if R1’s action locks a door (door1),
we generate the constraint door1.lock==locked; if R1
sets the heating temperature of a thermostat to a value T and
R2 uses a temperature sensor (tSensor) in its condition, the
effect constraint is tSensor.temperature>=T. We then
merge the effect constraint with R2’s condition and solve the
new constraint satisfaction problem. If the problem is solvable,
R2’s condition may be enabled and otherwise disabled by R1.
D. Detecting Chained CAI Threats
There may exist apps which satisfy one of the interference
patterns but are still installed, decided by users. Hence, when
we detect a rule r1 defined by a new app interferes with
(or is interfered with by) an existing rule r2, we also need
to detect if r1 interferes with other rules indirectly via r2
(or other rules interfere with r1 indirectly). To this end, we
record all rule pairs that satisfy certain pattern but are still
installed by users in a list Allowed in a bottom-up manner
(from the user installed the first app for his home). After the
pairwise detection between new rules and old rules, we search
this detection result and the Allowed list to find long-chained
rules.
VII. CONFIGURATION INFORMATION COLLECTION
Challenge. In Section V, we track the data flow by con-
structing data constraints starting from sources. Recall that
we take as sources the input methods, which are rendered
as user-friendly graphical interfaces for users to specify values
for variables (referred to as configuration information in this
paper) during app installation or updating. To precisely detect
CAI threats, we need to know the values of such sources.
Take the Actuator Race in the category of action-interference
threats as an example: the two rules R1 and R2 should operate
on the same actuator as a precondition to cause an Actuator
Race. Such device binding as well as other configuration
information (e.g., a user-defined threshold for comparison)
cannot be obtained through static analysis. Therefore, how to
collect the configuration information without modifying the
SmartThings platform becomes a challenge since there are
no APIs available for obtaining the configuration information
from the SmartThings cloud or the companion app.
Solution. An ideal solution is to integrate our threat detector
and frontend modules into SmartThings companion app, so
that configuration information can be easily collected within
the app. However, the companion app is not open-source and
we do not assume any modification on the platform’s cloud or
mobile app for HOMEGUARD to work. Hence, we propose a
practical solution to obtain configuration information, includ-
ing a code instrumentation technique to collect configuration
information from inside an app, and a messaging mechanism
for transmitting the collected information to the HOMEGUARD
app. The HOMEGUARD app implements the threat detector
and frontend modules as another mobile app.
A. Code Instrumentation
Code instrumentation has been used in previous research
on the SmartThings platform [29], [46], [47]. In our case, the
instrumentation is only to gather the configuration information
during app installation or configuration update, so it introduces
a negligible overhead. We implement the SmartApp instrumen-
tation with a Groovy script. Listing 3, as an example, shows
how the app in Listing 1 is instrumented (most of the unaltered
lines are omitted).
The lifecycle method updated is invoked during app
installation or configuration update, so we insert configuration
collection logic in updated. The inserted lines are the
same for all apps except for Lines 8-10, which collect the
configuration information specific to each app. The appname
can be obtained from the metadata in the definition
method5. In each item of the lists devices and values,
the devRefStr and varStr are the variable names de-
fined in input methods, and devRef and var denote
the real values specified by users in the mobile app. The
Groovy script reuses some code of the rule extractor to
identify the appname, devRefStr, and varStr, so that
the code instrumentation is a completely automatic process.
The collectConfigInfo method (Line 14) assembles
a Uniform Resource Identifier uri that contains the app
name, a list of mappings between the device variable name
5Definition is a method that determines how the SmartApp is described
in the mobile app UI.
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Listing 3: Code snippet showing how the app in Listing 1
is instrumented. Line 3, Lines 8–11 and Lines 14–23 are the
inserted code.
1// ...
2// Specify the phone that runs HomeGuard
3input "patchedphone", "phone", required: true, title: "Phone
number?"
4// ...
5def updated() {
6// ...
7// inserted code
8def appname = "ComfortTV"
9def devices = [[devRefStr :"tv1", devRef:tv1], [devRefStr :"tSensor",
devRef:tSensor], [devRefStr:"window1", devRef:window1]]
10def values = [[ varStr :"threshold1", var:threshold1]]
11collectConfigInfo (appname, devices , values )
12}
13// ...
14def collectConfigInfo (appname, devices , values ) {
15def uri = "http://my.com/appname:${appname}/"
16devices .each { dev −>
17uri = uri + dev.devRefStr + ":" + dev.devRef.getId() + "/"
18}
19values .each { val−>
20uri = uri + val . varStr + ":" +val.var + "/"
21}
22sendSmsMessage(patchedphone,uri)
23}
devRefStr and the underlying unique 128-bit device ID
(devRef.getId() in Line 17), and the variable names and
values (Line 20).
B. Messaging Deployment
We have two options for sending the above URI from
SmartThings cloud6 to the HOMEGUARD app: SMS (short
messaging service) and HTTP based messaging. Both ap-
proaches are widely used for messaging and have their own
pros and cons. For instance, SMS is easy to deploy but may fail
to work if users go abroad, while HTTP works internationally
but requires a relay server due to mobile IP addressing issues.
We implement both SMS and HTTP solutions in our proof-
of-concept prototype.
SMS messaging is easier to implement since SmartThings
provide a convenient API sendSmsMessage for sending
messages to a specified phone number. In Listing 1, Line 3 will
be rendered as a UI for homeowners to fill out the phone num-
ber and Line 22 sends the collected configuration information
(i.e., uri) to the specified phone. When installing or updating
an app, the homeowner receives an SMS message containing
uri. Fig. 7(a) shows an example of the SMS message received
by the homeowner’s smartphone. When the received link is
clicked, the HOMEGUARD app installed on the same phone is
launched and receives the link (e.g., by declaring an Intent
Filter in Android OS [2]); it parses the link to obtain the
configuration information. The HOMEGUARD app then sends
an HTTP request with the appname to our backend server
(hosting the rule extractor module) to retrieve the rules of
the app. The backend server maintains a database to store
the rules extracted from the public apps in SmartThings app
store, in order to speed up the response time (note that the
6Note that SmartApps run on SmartThings backend cloud.
(a) The unique 128-bit device
IDs and static values are encap-
sulated in a URI.
(b) The frontend app shows the
rule defined by ComfortTV
and the detected CAI threats.
Fig. 7: Screenshots showing the collected configuration infor-
mation and the HOMEGUARD frontend app interface when
installing ComfortTV to a home with ColdDefender and
CatchLiveShow already installed.
backend server also provides an interface to extract rules from
a custom app on demand). Besides, the HOMEGUARD app
also generates device constraints (e.g., tv1=0e0b...741b)
and user-defined value constraints (e.g., threshold1=30)
based on the collected configuration information for detecting
CAI threats. As the HOMEGUARD app records all the history
information of the already installed apps, the threat detection
can be performed efficiently. After that, the detection result
is transformed and presented to the user; Fig. 7(b) shows an
example. The user then can determine whether to keep or
delete the new SmartApp, or change its configuration.
The HTTP-based implementation shares a similar design but
employs Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) [6] for relaying
the messages from SmartThings cloud to the homeowner’s
smartphone. At the initial startup of the HOMEGUARD app,
Firebase generates a unique registration token for each HOME-
GUARD app instance. In the instrumentation code, we ask
the homeowner to specify the registration token instead of
the phone number (Line 3 in Listing 3). Thus, the uri is
sent to Firebase via the HTTP API httpPost (instead of
sendSmsMessage) and the firebase server then pushes uri
as a notification message to the HOMEGUARD app instance
specified by the registration token. The notification message is
rendered as a Notification [3] for the HOMEGUARD app. By
clicking the notification, the HOMEGUARD app is launched to
detect CAI threats.
VIII. EVALUATION
We demonstrate how CAI threats can be constructed using
some seemingly benign malicious apps and how the threats
can be exploited VIII-A. We then evaluate the effectiveness
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and efficiency of HOMEGUARD in Section VIII-B and Sec-
tion VIII-C, respectively.
A. Exploitation Experiments
As presented in Section IV-A, new attack vectors exploiting
CAI threats arise. In order to demonstrate the exploitation
feasibility, we act as an attacker and use 5 SmartApps
we have developed, i.e., ComfortTV, ColdDefender,
CatchLiveShow, BurglarFinder, and NightCare, to
simulate the exploitation of CAI threats. Each of these apps
seems to provide useful functionalities. But when these apps
are installed in the same home, their interplay introduces CAI
threats and can be exploited. For instance, BurglarFinder
and NightCare cause a condition-interference threat, and
the user may be unaware that her BurglarFinder is
already disabled by NightCare, and the attacker may break
in without triggering alerts. We install all the five apps on
SmartThings Web IDE and observe that these apps interfere
with each other through the trigger, condition, or action, as
discussed in Section III. In this experiment, we prove that
SmartThings currently has no mechanisms to detect or handle
CAI threats, which validate the criticality and urgency of our
research.
B. Effectiveness
Rule Extraction. We first evaluate the implemented rule
extractor’s ability to extract automation rules from SmartApps.
We collect all the 182 SmartApps in the public repository
[11] and manually remove the 36 Web Services SmartApps,
as these web services SmartApps expose web endpoints for
external applications to get device information or control
devices through web API calls and do not define automation
rules themselves [10]. We manually review the code of the
remaining 146 SmartApps and record the rules per app. To
avoid human errors, we also install these apps and use the
simulated devices provided by SmartThings to verify the
correctness. The manual analysis results are used as ground
truth. Then we use our rule extractor to automatically extract
rules from these apps and compare the results with the ground
truth.
Our rule extractor can analyze most apps (124 out of
146) correctly. There were several special cases we did not
expect. Feed My Pet uses device.petfeedershield
in the input method instead of a capability; Sleepy
Time uses device.jawboneUser; and Camera Power
Scheduler uses a public API runDaily, which is not
documented by SmartThings. We have added the non-standard
device types into the capability list and modeled the undocu-
mented APIs we encountered to fix the issue.
As our rule extractor employs symbolic execution to explore
all the paths in apps systematically, it is able to extract the
rules in an app precisely and completely. Thus, we envision
that it can help the SmartThings staff review the code of
SmartApps to check whether a SmartApp contains malicious
behaviors. To evaluate its effectiveness in extracting rules
from malware, which may hide malicious logics and thus
impose extra challenges to our rule extractor, we ran it over 18
representative malicious SmartApps collected from Literatures
[22], [29], [46], [47] to test if it can extract rules correctly. As
shown in Table III, the rule extractor can obtain the precise
rules for the majority of the cases. Therefore, the rule extractor
can be applied to better detect malicious apps.
Two exceptions are the endpoint attack and the app update
attack. The SmartApps used for endpoint attacks are web
service apps which do not define automation themselves but
expose callable endpoints for third parties, i.e., the automation
rules are defined outside of SmartApps, so the rule extractor
cannot obtain the complete automation logics by only analyz-
ing SmartApps. However, the rule extractor can still identify
malicious logics embedded in the request handler methods.
The app update attack is difficult to detect by static methods
since SmartApp developers can update the cloud instances
for all users without any user awareness. This can be solved
through the platform by enforcing the checking whenever an
app is updated.
CAI Threat Detection on Real Cases. In order to demonstrate
the capability of HOMEGUARD in finding CAI threats in
real-world cases, we pick up 90 out of the 146 apps in the
SmartThings app repository for testing. We exclude 56 apps
because their functionalities are to send notifications to the
home owner’s smartphone and do not control devices. As
this test is to find all possible pairs having CAI threats from
a pool of apps and it is infeasible to exhaustively try all
device-app binding situations, we consider two rules use the
same device if they use devices of the same type7. To avoid
excessive false positives due to this setting, we classify devices
using capability.switch into different types according
to the app description, since various types of devices support
capability.switch to indicate on/off states. Note that
in the real deployment, HOMEGUARD distinguish if two rules
operate on the same device according to the 128-bit device IDs
in the collected configuration information (see Section VII).
We perform the CAI threat detection for each pair of the
90 apps and record the results. The SmartThings platform
provides a well-built simulator and simulated devices, allowing
us to verify the correctness of the discovered threats. We also
purchase some real devices, including a SmartThings hub v2,
a motion sensor, a presence sensor, a multipurpose sensor
(combining a contact sensor and a temperature sensor), two
bulbs, two smart outlets to reproduce and verify a subset of
the discovered threats.
We find that a lot of apps can cause CAI threats and show
the statistics in Fig. 8. Apps that control a commonly used
switch or a mode tend to involve all kind of the threats. Below,
we describe some detected CAI threats in SmartApps.
1) SwitchChangesMode8 changes the current mode of a
smart home according to the on/off state of a switch,
and MakeItSo binds a group of states of several switches,
7The device types used by a SmartApp can be determined by examining
their associated capabilities.
8The spaces in SmartApp names are omitted.
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TABLE III: Extracting rules from malicious apps.
Attack Description Malicious SmartApp Name Can handle?
Malicious Control Embed malicious logics beyond app description CreatingSeizuresUsingStrobedLight "
Abusing Permission Exploit overprivilege to perform attacks shiqiBatteryMonitor "
Adware Embed ads into notification messages HelloHome/CODetector "
Spyware Leak private information via HTTP/side channel LockManager/shiqiLightController/DoorLockPinCodeSnooping "
Ransomware Refuse to take actions until user pay money WaterValve "
Remote Control Execute dynamic commands according to HTTP response SmokeDetector/FireAlarm "
IPC Malicious apps exchange information by IPC MaliciousCameraIPC & PresenceSensor "
Shadow Payload Send sensitive information to attacker’s encrypted url AutoCamera2 "
Endpoint Attack Trigger malicious functions via HTTP requests BackdoorPinCodeInjection/DisablingVacationMode %
App Update Edit the original codes after released BonVoyageRepackaging/PowersOutAlert %
locks, and thermostats to a mode and restores the group of
states each time the home goes into that mode. The two
apps may create a covert rule that a switch’s state triggers
the action of unlocking a door.
2) CurlingIron, which turns on a set of outlets (switches)
if a motion is detected, may create a covert rule by
chaining with SwitchChangesMode and MakeItSo.
This covert rule unlocks a door when motion is detected.
The covert rule introduces a new attack surface that a
burglar unlocks the door by spoofing the motion sensor
(e.g., using CO2 laser [43]).
3) NFCTagToggle allows a user to toggle a set of appliances
and door locks by tapping a smartphone app button, and
LockItWhenILeave locks doors automatically if the
user’s presence sensor leaves a location. If the user taps
the app button to turn off appliances and lock doors
after leaving home but LockItWhenILeave has already
locked the door, the door will be unlocked.
4) LetThereBeDark leads to action races on the same
lights when working with other light control apps, such as
UndeadEarlyWarning, LightsOffWhenClosed,
SmartNightlight, TurnItOnFor5Minutes, etc.
5) It’sTooHot and EnergySaver impose a Self-
Disabling threat. EnergySaver turns off a set of devices
when the real-time electricity usage is over the user-defined
threshold, which may disable It’sTooHot to turn on air
conditioners or fans in a narrow situation: the turning-on of
air conditioners is the last straw that makes the electricity
usage exceed the threshold.
6) LightUptheNight contains a Loop-Triggering interfer-
ence, leading to unexpected light flashing. This app is a
real-world case of the LT example in Section III-B.
C. Efficiency
Rule Extraction Computation and Storage. To test the
efficiency of our rule extractor, we run it 10 times on all 146
apps and get the average execution time. The time is 1341ms
per app on average on a desktop with 3.4GHz Intel Core i7
CPU-6700, 8GB memory, and Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. Note that
the rule extraction for the publicly available apps is a one-time
cost and can be done offline. The performance is satisfactory
even for providing online services to users who would like
Fig. 8: Statistics of the detection result on 90 SmartApps.
Switch: controlling a capability.switch without spec-
ifying the specific device type (e.g., light, valve, television,
etc.); Mode: controlling location mode; Others: controlling
other devices. The threat acronyms are defined in Table I.
to install their own custom apps. We also test the size of
the rule file of a SmartApp, which needs to be stored on the
HOMEGUARD server hosted by rule extractor and transmitted
to the user’s mobile device. In our implementation, we use
JSON strings to store rules and the rule file for an app is
6.2KB on average.
Configuration Information Collection Speed. Both config-
uration information collection and threat detection are done
online and their speed directly affects user experience. In
our implementation, the latency introduced by configuration
information collection depends on the response time of Smart-
Things cloud and the SMS/HTTP transmission latency. We
time the response time by inserting invoking (now()) to get
the Unix epochs T1 and T2 before and after the instrumentation
code, respectively. The time duration (T2−T1) is 27 ms. Simi-
larly, we record the epoch T3 when we receive the SMS/HTTP
message on the phone and calculate the transmission latency
(T3−T2). The averaged latency from 100 trials is 3120ms for
SMS and 1058ms for HTTP, which we believe is acceptable
during installation.
CAI Detection Speed. CAI detection is a real-time process
and runs on users’ mobile devices. To evaluate the efficiency
of HOMEGUARD, we test the averaged execution time for
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Fig. 9: CAI detection overhead for a pair of rules. Green dotted
lines mean the constraint solving for detecting CT, SD, and LT
threats can reuse the solving result of AR and the constraint
solving for DC can reuse that of EC. The threat acronyms are
defined in Table I.
detecting a specific CAI threat between two rules on a
Samsung Galaxy S8 smartphone with Android OS 8.1.0.
As shown in Fig. 9, the most time-consuming operation is
constraint solving. The constraints solving overhead in EC
is lower since involved constraint number is half of that in
AR and GC. To avoid unnecessary constraint solving, we first
perform a light-weight candidate filtering based on the pre-
stored mapping lists and reuse the constraint solving result in
detecting different threats. For an arbitrary pair of rules, the
maximum total time for detecting all CAI threats is 1156 ms.
The actual detection time is much less since two rules rarely
fit all threat patterns and thus constraint solving overhead can
be avoided.
D. Discussion and Limitations
1) User Intervention: Due to the inherent weakness of
dynamic logging, previous work [29] needs multiple occur-
rences of user intervention when an app issues a command.
By utilizing the powerful path searching capability of symbolic
execution, HOMEGUARD extracts the rules of an app all at
once. Hence, users in this paper only participate in a one-
time decision making on the HOMEGUARD frontend app when
they manually install a new app or update the configuration
of an already installed app. Users focus more on handling
app functionalities during installation than during the app’s
daily execution, so HOMEGUARD does not risk minimum user
habituation or annoyance. It is infeasible to further eliminate
the one-time decision making because inter-app interactions
are somewhat subjective, as we discussed in Section IV-B.
2) Dynamic Features of Programming Languages: A con-
cern may be that our static symbolic execution engine can-
not effectively deal with the dynamic features of Groovy.
However, all SmartApps are instances of an abstract class
Executor which provides a variety of methods available
for app development and run in the sandboxed environment,
which is customized and enforced by SmartThings. Smart-
Things enforces all SmartApps to implement an abstract class
TABLE IV: Manners for defining rules on different platforms
Platform Manner Language SpecificAPIs?
Android Things program Java "
HomeKit program Swift/Objective C "
OpenHAB program Domain Specific
Language
"
SmartThings program Groovy "
IFTTT template – –
Executor which provides a set of methods and restricts
access to many Groovy methods and features. Thus, only
GString is an allowable dynamic feature in SmartApps.
GString enables remote servers to control the property
accesses and method calls in a SmartApp by manipulating the
string values. However, this concern is relieved because the
SmartThings code review bans dynamic method execution and
needs developers to use a switch statement on all possible
GString values before doing anything with it [9]. Therefore,
our static analysis handles all possible values of GString
separately and branches the execution path when encountering
a switch statement.
3) Backward Compatibility: A practical concern is how
to detect CAI threats in apps that were installed before
the employment of the proposed system. This problem can
be solved by HOMEGUARD conveniently without developer
efforts. Users can reinstall the instrumented versions of these
apps on the phone companion app without changing their
configurations; the instrumentation code in updated methods
will be invoked and then the HOMEGUARD app starts to detect
CAI threats, as we discussed in Section VII.
4) Multi-Platform Applicability: HOMEGUARD supports
different IoT platforms by design, considering home members
may work with multiple platforms simultaneously. The rule
extractor module is platform-specific since platforms may
use different languages and customized APIs, as shown in
Table IV. Our work shows that symbolic execution works well
in extracting automation rules from the source code of Groovy-
based SmartApps. Symbolic execution has been widely used
for software testing in various systems [26], [35] and shows
its powerfulness for supporting multiple languages such as
source code [17], bytecode [39] and custom intermediate
representations (IRs) [25]. Therefore, the only engineering
effort for supporting multiple platforms is to implement our
symbolic execution based rule extractor for other languages.
Other than programs/apps, some platforms define rules through
templates. For example, IFTTT provides graphical interfaces
on its mobile app and web page for users to define automa-
tion rules by selecting pre-defined templates and filling out
parameters. Rules can be extracted by crawling text data on
the related pages and parse the texts with natural language
processing (NLP) technologies [28].
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TABLE V: Comparison with related work.
Name Inter-appAnalysis
Proactive
Defense
Low
Overhead
No Runtime
Intervention
ContexIoT % % % %
ProvThings " % % "
SmartAuth % " " "
HOMEGUARD " " " "
IX. RELATED WORK
A. IoT Security and Privacy
Recently, IoT platform security has been extensively stud-
ied. Fernandes et al. use a black-boxed static analysis on Sam-
sung SmartThings, revealing several significant design flaws,
such as coarse capability, coarse SmartApp-SmartDevice bind-
ing, and insufficient event data protection, which can or
have been exploited by SmartApps to perform overpriviledged
actions [22]. ContexIoT proposes a context-based permission
system for IoT platforms to identify fine-grained context
information and prompt the information at runtime for users
to make an access control decision [29]. To separation the
execution of a SmartApp into context collection and per-
mission granting phases, they are the first to use patching
mechanism to collect runtime data and pause the execution of
SmartApps. However, ContexIoT needs users to participate in
making decisions at runtime, which overshadows the benefit
of home automation, and worse, may violate the 20-second
execution time limits for each method in SmartThings if users
do not respond in time. SmartAuth performs static analysis
of the source code and uses NLP techniques to analyze code
annotations, capability requests of SmartApps and developers’
descriptions in the app store, to detect whether a SmartApp’s
functionalities faithfully follow the expectation of users [46].
Due to the nature of NLP, SmartAuth suffers if a malicious
app uses customized meaningless or even malicious method
and property names to hide the real SmartThings commands
and attributes. Also, the static analysis for extracting rules of
a SmartApp can be improved since the authors only target
a subset of data types. Wang et al. presents ProvThings
[47], a platform-centric logging framework that can construct
data provenance graphs for all activities in an IoT system
and use them to find out reasons for troubleshooting when
an abnormality occurs. The ProvThings is prototyped for
the SmartThings by instrumenting SmartApps. ProvThings
is mainly for forensics rather than proactive defense. Ty-
che introduces a risk-based permission system to solve the
overprivilege problems by grouping permissions according to
their risk levels and allows users to grant permissions for
a device by specifying an allowed risk level [40]. Tyche
enforces the risk-based model by rewriting SmartApps based
on AST transformations. FlowFence protects IoT data from
leakage and misuse by using sandboxes and taint-tracking to
enforce data flows between data sources and data sinks. The
implementation is done on an Android OS which is not the
mainstream in current IoT hubs and clouds. A comparison of
existing appified IoT security solutions is shown in Table V.
In addition to platforms, IoT security and privacy in other
dimensions also have been widely studied. Fernandes et al.
shed light on the distinctive characteristics of IoT security from
classic IT security in hardware, software, network, and appli-
cation layers [23]. Arias et al. [14] and Liu et al. [33] conduct
broad studies on the security threats in IoT device development
and deployment. Tan et al. [45] propose an attestation solution
to ensure the device firmware and software integrity. Chen
et al. propose a fuzzing-based detection framework to find
memory corruption vulnerabilities in IoT devices [18]. A lot
of work focus on identifying cyber attacks [13], [44] and
hardening communication and authentication protocols [49],
[27], [12]. Siby et al. design a framework IoTScanner for
passively monitoring and analyzing IoT traffics [44]. Also,
formal analytics based on probabilistic models are employed
to estimate the security risks and guide the configurations of
IoT systems [36], [37].
B. Collusive Attacks in Mobile Apps
We discuss collusion attacks in the mobile application
domain since collusion attacks share similarities with CAI
threats. That is, collusion attacks also leverage multiple apps
to bypass malicious code anti-malware techniques that detect
per single app, such as Google Play Protect which is based on
machine learning and anti-malware apps (e.g., Avast).
A lot of work have been done to characterize and detect
mobile app collusion attacks. Davi et al. [20] shed light upon
possible privilege escalation attacks in Android. Xu et al. [48]
study app collusion where one app surreptitiously launches
others in background and develop a static analysis tool for
detecting app collusion by examining app binaries. Marforio
et al. [34] give a comprehensive introduction of possible
collusion channels. Chin et al. [19] firstly present a com-
prehensive analysis of threats based on inter-app ICC (Inter-
Component Communication). Many collusion app detection
works are based on examining inter-app ICC data flows [32],
[30], [41], [31]. Bosu et al. [16] enhances the scalability and
accuracy for large-scale detection by designing a new open-
source resolution tool for inspecting inter-app ICC data flows.
However, the collusion attacks and CAI threats are different
in many aspects. Collusion attacks need two or more malicious
apps to actively collude by design to launch attacks. That is,
a privileged app collects sensitive information and sends it
to another app (or apps), which then sends the information
outside the boundaries of the device to steal private data,
or perform harmful actions (e.g., financial transactions) with
the received information. Therefore, explicit collusion logics
and inter-app communication supported by the mobile system
architecture are necessities for apps to collude. Thus, code
analysis and information tracking (e.g., taint analysis [15],
[21]) techniques are effective to identify collusions by focusing
on inter-app communication channels. In CAI threats, apps
do not have explicit malicious code for collusion and do not
need to convey data. The interplay between apps is through
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controlling devices and affecting the home environment, which
needs to be handled by totally different techniques. Moreover,
collusion attacks usually abuse permission to, for example,
collect and disclose private data, while CAI threats cause
various conflicts and chained execution without violating or
abusing permissions. Last but not least, collusive attacks are
achieved via deliberately distributed malicious mobile apps
or SDKs (Software Development Kits); other than malicious
apps, CAI threats can also be caused due to installing and/or
configuring benign apps.
X. CONCLUSION
In an appified smart home, multiple independently de-
veloped apps may interplay and interfere with each other,
causing undesired and even dangerous conflicts and covert
rules, which we call Cross-App Interference (CAI) threats.
Such threats may not only lead to unexpected automation,
but also introduce security and privacy problems to the smart
home. We have categorized CAI threats and introduced new
attack vectors that exploit them. Without proper handling,
the problem will exacerbate when an increasing number of
smart devices and apps are installed at a smart home. We
have designed and built a system HOMEGUARD to address
the problem. It applies symbolic execution to extract rules
from apps completely and precisely and employs a constraint
solver to evaluate the relation between rules for systematic
threat detection. Moreover, we have proposed a practical
deployment path that utilizes code instrumentation to collect
the installation information and a frontend app to perform
the detection on the user’s smartphone. We evaluated HOME-
GUARD using real SmartApps in the app store and discovered
a large number of potential threats. The evaluation results show
that HOMEGUARD is effective, efficient and precise.
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APPENDIX
A. Sinks in the Symbolic Executor
Sinks are defined for the symbolic executor to identify rule
actions. The most common sinks are commands supported
by capabilities. Capabilities, similar to permissions in mobile
applications, abstract various types or subtypes of real devices
according to functionalities. A real device supports one or
more capabilities and can be granted to SmartApps which
request the supported capabilities through input methods.
Each capability contains a set of attributes that can be accessed
by apps and commands that control the real device. For ex-
ample, capability.lock defines an attribute lock which
indicates a lock device’s locked/unlocked state and two
commands lock() and unlock() for controlling a lock.
The capability-defined commands are considered as sinks.
In addition, SmartThings provide a lot of APIs for building
SmartApps and device handlers. To filter out irrelevant method
calls that are not home automation actions, we only consider
APIs that perform sensitive actions (see Table VI), e.g., read
attributes from sensors, issue commands to actuators, or send
data to third-party devices or servers, as sinks (i.e., rule
actions) in our rule extraction.
TABLE VI: SmartThings provided APIs we considered as
sinks in rule extraction.
API Name Description
httpDelete
httpGet
httpHead
httpPost
httpPostJson
httpPut
httpPutJson
Executes an HTTP DELETE/GET/HEAD/POST/PUT
request
runIn Executes the specified method after the specified seconds
runEvery1Minute
runEvery5Minutes
runEvery10Minutes
runEvery15Minutes
runEvery30Minutes
runEvery1Hour
runEvery3Hours
Creates a recurring schedule that executes the specified
method periodically, as indicated by the method name
runOnce Executes the specified method once at the specified date
and time
schedule Creates a scheduled job that calls the specified method
once per day at the specified time
sendHubCommand Sends a command to the SmartThings hub, which then
issues a command defined in the arguments to LAN-
connected devices to access device attributes or control
these devices
sendSms
sendSmsMessage
Sends an SMS message to the specified phone number
setLocationMode Set the home’s Mode to the specified value, which can
be subscribed or accessed by SmartApps
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